"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts by Ewerhart, Christian & Schmitz, Patrick W.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
”Yes Men,” Integrity, and the Optimal
Design of Incentive Contracts
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
2000
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12534/
MPRA Paper No. 12534, posted 6. January 2009 06:17 UTC
“Yes Men,” Integrity, and the
Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts1
Christian Ewerharta, Patrick W. Schmitzb
aThe Boston Consulting Group, Westend Carree, Grüneburgweg 18,
D-60322 Frankfurt a.M., Germany
bUniversity of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24—42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany
January 2000
Abstract. In a pioneering approach towards the explanation of the
phenomenon of “yes man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993)
argued that incentive contracts in employment relationships generally make
a worker distort his privately acquired information. This would imply that
there is a trade-oﬀ between inducing a worker to exert costly eﬀort and
inducing him to tell the truth. In contrast, we show that with optimally
designed contracts, which we term integrity contracts, the worker will both
exert eﬀort and report his information truthfully, and that hence the first
best can be achieved.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the standard principal agent model has been
fruitfully extended in a number of dimensions.3 One of the more recent de-
velopments of this literature relates to incentive problems connected with the
acquisition and transmission of information in organizations.4 More specif-
ically, in an approach towards the explanation of the phenomenon of “yes
man” behavior in organizations, Prendergast (1993) has argued that con-
tracts cannot induce a worker to both exert costly eﬀort on an information
gathering activity and subsequently reveal his privately acquired informa-
tion. This implies that the first best cannot be achieved, even though the
actors are risk-neutral and there are no rents due to wealth constraints or
pre-contractual private information. The basic idea underlying the argument
is the following. In order to induce the worker to exert eﬀort, the manager
will have to use an incentive scheme that is based on an (imperfect) measure
of the eﬀort level chosen by the worker. The manager will therefore compare
her own information with the worker’s report and pay him accordingly. Now,
if the worker observes, in addition to his valuable information, a signal on
the manager’s information, then the incentive scheme induces the worker to
behave as a “yes man”, i.e., he will use his second signal (which contains no
new information on the true parameter) in order to bias his report towards
his estimate of the manager’s signal.
In this paper we argue that the “yes man” phenomenon, rather than be-
ing a necessary feature of relationships between managers and subordinates,
3Cf. Hart and Holmström (1987) and Salanié (1997).
4See Aghion and Tirole (1997), Crémer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998), Dewatripont and
Tirole (1998), Levitt and Snyder (1995), Lewis and Sappington (1997), and Shavell (1994).
Cf. also Hermalin (1998) and the literature cited there.
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is a consequence of suboptimal contract design. We will show that there are
simple contracts which make the worker both reveal his private information
and exert the first-best level of eﬀort. We find that this result is interesting
for at least four reasons. First, we stay within the contractibility assumptions
of Prendergast’s (1993) original model.5 Next, although the manager’s signal
is statistically suﬃcient for the worker’s second signal, we argue that never-
theless the second signal is still valuable for the manager. This runs counter
the intuition that it is suﬃcient to ask the worker to report his useful signal
only (cf. Holmström, 1979). Moreover, our main result is in accordance with
a recent strand of management literature that argues in favor of supporting
ethically sound behavior (see e.g. Paine, 1994) via top management direc-
tives. Finally, the view taken in this paper is also supported by the fact that
in the 90’s an increasing number of businesses started to implement guiding
principles for their work force focussing on values like honesty and integrity,
both within the firm and in relation with customers.6
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section,
the basic model is introduced. In section 3 we formally show how the first best
can be achieved by an integrity contract. The results are further discussed
in section 4. Section 5 concludes. Some technical arguments have been
5This is in contrast to a series of recent papers that prove first-best results by modifying
the set of assumptions in existing models. For instance, Chung (1991), Rogerson (1992),
Hermalin and Katz (1993), Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Nöldeke and Schmidt
(1995), Edlin and Reichelstein (1996) and Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that the first
best can be achieved in the framework of Rogerson (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988).
6E.g., in 1996 the General Motors Board of Directors wrote “This company will have
a successful and enduring life — earned by the value of its products and services, and
the integrity of its people.” Cf. General Motors (1999). See also Shell (1999): “Shell
companies insist on honesty, integrity and fairness in all aspects of their business and
expect the same in their relationships with all those with whom they do business.”
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relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
We present a slightly simplified version of Prendergast’s (1993) model which
is suﬃcient to make the point.7 Assume that there are two risk-neutral
individuals called manager and worker. The manager is responsible for a
long-term project, the result of which depends on how precise her pre-project
estimate of an uncertain parameter η will be. Specifically, it is assumed that
the expected value of the project’s long-term return accruing to the manager
(after a suitable normalization) is equal to the negative of the variance of the
manager’s estimate of η. The joint prior of both manager and worker on η
is taken to be identical to the actual distribution of the parameter, which is
assumed to be normal with mean η0 and variance σ20 > 0. At the moment
when the manager takes up her task she receives a verifiable signal8
ηm = η + εm,
where εm denotes a normally distributed error with mean 0 and variance
σ2m > 0. The manager is given the option to employ the worker for the task
of gathering additional information. When being hired by the manager, the
worker can generate a private signal
ηw = η + εw,
7The simplification is that in our model the variance of the manager’s signal will be
exogenously given. Giving the manager the possibility to reduce this variance by exerting
eﬀort complicates the exposition but does not change the economic insights.
8This signal may be interpreted as a documentation that comprises the factors that
eventually led to the initiation of the project. If the manager’s signal were not verifiable,
no eﬀort could ever be induced.
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where εw is a normally distributed error term with mean 0. The precision
of the worker’s private signal is assumed to depend on how much eﬀort he
invests in the information gathering activity. For a worker exerting eﬀort
e ≥ 0, let C(e) denote his cost of eﬀort, and σ2w = h(e) the resulting variance
of the error term εw. Assume that C(e) is continuously diﬀerentiable for
nonnegative eﬀort levels and that C 0 (e) is nonnegative, strictly increasing,
and unbounded from above with C 0(0) = 0. Assume also that h(e) is con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable for nonnegative eﬀort levels and that h0(e) is strictly
negative and strictly increasing. Finally, it is assumed that the worker also
privately observes a signal on what the manager has seen,
ηλ = ηm + λ,
where λ is a normally distributed error with mean 0 and variance σ2λ, where
0 < σ2λ <∞.9
As a benchmark, consider the first-best solution, which requires C(e) +
V ar[η|ηm, ηw] to be minimized. In a perfect world, the worker reports his
private information ηw truthfully.10 Given a certain eﬀort level e, the condi-
tional variance of the manager’s posterior distribution of η given ηm and ηw
reads
V ∗ =
σ2wσ2mσ20
σ2mσ20 + σ2mσ2w + σ20σ2w
.
Thus, under the assumptions made, there exists an eﬃcient eﬀort level e∗ >
9The random variables η, εm, εw, and λ are assumed to be uncorrelated.
10Note that ηm is statistically suﬃcient for ηλ, so that the worker does not need to
report ηλ in a first-best world.
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0.11 The necessary first-order condition is given by
C 0(e∗) = −h0(e∗) [σ
2
0σ2m]2
[σ20σ2m + σ2mσ2w + σ2wσ20]2
.
3 The first best is achievable
Under second-best conditions, i.e., if neither eﬀort nor long-term return is
contractible, the manager may want to induce the worker to exert eﬀort by
oﬀering suitable monetary incentives. Prendergast (1993) assumes that the
manager measures the worker’s performance by comparing the information
that is available to her with a verifiable message bηw to be sent by the worker.
He shows that if the worker is induced to exert strictly positive eﬀort, then
he does not report ηw honestly, yielding a variance of the manager’s estimate
of η which is strictly higher than V ∗. This implies that either the induced
eﬀort level or the precision of the manager’s estimate must be suboptimal.
We shall now describe a contract that implements the first best. The
contract says that the worker has to make a report consisting of two parts,eηw and eηm. In the first part of the report, the worker is asked to reveal his
11To see this, note that total costs are continuous on [0;∞[ and that
lim
e→∞
C(e) + V ∗(e) =∞,
by the assumptions made on C(.) and by V ∗(.) > 0. Notice that in general the second-
order condition, which requires convexity of the total cost function C(e) + V ∗(e) with
respect to e, need not be satisfied. In fact, V ∗(.) is convex in e if and only if
h00(e) ≥ 2[h
0(e)]2
c+ h(e)
,
for all e > 0, where c = σ20σ
2
m/(σ
2
0 + σ
2
m). Hence, if e.g. h(e) = σ
2
w exp(−e), then for
c < σ2w, the function V
∗(.) is strictly convex in the non-empty interval ]| ln(c/σ2w)|;∞[,
but strictly concave in the non-empty interval ]0; | ln(c/σ2w)|[.
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valuable signal ηw. In the second part of the report, the worker is asked
to announce his best estimate for the manager’s information ηm. Then the
worker is paid solely on the basis of the second part of his report. Specifically,
the worker receives an amount w1 if |eηm−ηm| < k and w0 otherwise, for some
constant k. We will refer to such contracts as integrity contracts. Note that
an integrity contract is completely specified by the tupel (w0, w1, k).
While explicit integrity contracts may not be frequently observed in the
real world in a literal sense, they may actually be quite common in implicit
contracting. For example, it is common practice for political and economic
advisors to structure their written reports for political decision makers in one
part that contains the facts and another part in which conclusions and rec-
ommendations are derived. Although both parts of the report are required,
the political leader typically assesses the advisor by how close the conclu-
sions are to her gut feeling rather than by the details of the analysis. An
advisor coming up with conclusions similar to the ones the political leader
had derived alone thereby may gain a higher probability of being employed
again in the future.12
The following simple observation is the key to the main result of this
paper.
Observation: A worker working under the terms of an integrity contract
will truthfully reveal his acquired information in the first part of the report.
To see this, recall that in the given setting the worker does not have an
intrinsic interest in the decision to be made by the manager. Rather, it is
the worker’s objective to maximize his expected wage. Since the contractual
12In an alternative interpretation, a supervisor, rather than asking his subordinate for
his opinion on a specific issue, would ask him two questions: “What do you think is my
opinion on this matter” and afterwards “And, be honest, what is your own opinion?”.
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wage in an integrity contract does not depend on the first part of the report
(but regularly on the second), the worker is indiﬀerent between reporting
the truth and lying when announcing η˜w, so that it is rational for him to
truthfully reveal ηw.13
The fact that integrity contracts are consistent with honest revelation
of the worker’s valuable information allows to resolve the tension between
inducing the worker to exert eﬀort and encouraging him to reveal his acquired
information. This is the content of the following result.
Theorem 1 There exists an integrity contract which implements the first
best.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, it is suﬃcient to show that there
always exists an integrity contract (w0, w1, k) inducing the worker to exert
eﬀort e∗ > 0. If such a contract exists, then the first best can be achieved,
because the worker has no incentive to distort the information in the first
part of his report, as has been argued above.
We solve the worker’s remaining decision problem (the choice of the eﬀort
level and the second part of the report) in two steps. First, assume that eﬀort
e has been chosen and ηw and ηλ are realized. Then the worker maximizes
his interim net expected payoﬀ
w0 + [prob(|eηm − ηm| < k|ηw, ηλ)](w1 − w0)
by choice of eηm = eηm(e, ηw, ηλ). One can check that the worker’s interim
belief over the random variable ηm is normally distributed with mean M =
13We hence follow Prendergast (1993, p. 764) and the main-stream principal-agent
literature (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart 1983, p. 22) in assuming that the worker, when
indiﬀerent between any two optimal choices, chooses the one that is preferred by the
principal. If the worker has arbitrary small but positive costs of lying (e.g., due to scruples
or to faking pieces of evidence), he even strictly prefers to tell the truth.
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μ0ηw + μ1η0 + μ2ηλ, where the parameters are defined as
μ0 =
σ20σ2λ
σ20σ2w + σ20σ2m + σ2wσ2m + σ2λ[σ2w + σ
2
0]
μ1 =
σ2wσ2λ
σ20σ2w + σ20σ2m + σ2wσ2m + σ2λ[σ2w + σ
2
0]
μ2 =
σ20σ2w + σ20σ2m + σ2wσ2m
σ20σ2w + σ20σ2m + σ2wσ2m + σ2λ[σ2w + σ
2
0]
.
For a given k > 0, the term prob(|eηm−ηm| < k|ηw, ηλ) (which will in general
depend on e) is the integral of the density function f of the worker’s interim
belief on ηm over the interval [eηm − k,eηm + k]. Hence, as the Gauss density
f is symmetric with respect to its mean M , strictly increasing left from M ,
and strictly decreasing right from M , the term prob(|eηm − ηm| < k|ηw, ηλ)
is strictly increasing for eηm < M and strictly decreasing for eηm > M . Thus,
given a positive wage diﬀerence w1 −w0, the worker chooses eηm(e, ηw, ηλ) =
M .
Next, consider the worker’s choice of the eﬀort level. He maximizes
w0 + [prob(|M − ηm| < k)](w1 − w0)− C(e).
Note that prob(|M−ηm| < k) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function of σ2w.
Hence the necessary first-order condition for the worker is given by
h0(e)
∂prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w
(w1 − w0) = C 0(e).
The first-order condition becomes suﬃcient if the associated second-order
condition
∙
h00(e)
∂prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w
(1)
+[h0(e)]2
∂2prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w∂σ2w
¸
(w1 − w0)− C 00(e) < 0
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holds. We show in Appendix A that there is a k such that the second-order
condition holds for any positive wage diﬀerential w1 −w0, and for any eﬀort
level e > 0. Then, since C 0(e∗) > 0 and h0(e∗) < 0 by assumption, and since
∂prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w
= − k√
2πσ3
exp(− k
2
2σ2
)μ20 < 0 (2)
(see Appendix B), where σ2 =Var(M − ηm), there exists a (unique) positive
wage diﬀerence w1 − w0 such that the first-order condition holds for the
eﬃcient eﬀort level e∗. Hence, there is an integrity contract (w0, w1, k) that
induces the worker to choose e∗, which proves the theorem.
To understand how eﬃciency can be guaranteed, recall first that the man-
ager receives the full information from the worker under an integrity contract.
Thus, when using integrity contracts, the manager’s marginal revenue from
implementing a higher eﬀort level is the same as if the information of the
worker was publicly observable. Also, as the worker does not earn any rent
and is solely reimbursed for his cost, the marginal costs of implementing a
higher eﬀort level for the principal are equal to the social costs. Thus, since
the principal earns the social revenue and carries the social costs from a
given eﬀort level, he will prefer the first-best eﬀort level e∗ over any other
implementable eﬀort level.
While some technical work is necessary to provide a formal proof, it is
intuitively clear that the worker can be induced to exert the eﬃcient eﬀort
e∗. To see why, note that under an integrity contract the worker has an
interest to improve his information about the manager’s signal. Yet, the
only way to improve this information is by exerting eﬀort directed towards
an improvement of his information about the true state of the world. Hence,
by a suitable choice of incentives (i.e. of w1−w0) the worker can be induced,
via this external eﬀect, to ‘abuse’ his technology to produce a higher accuracy
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of the valuable information.14
From a contract-theoretic point of view, it is interesting to note that ask-
ing the worker to make two announcements can be welfare-improving, even
though the manager’s own signal is statistically suﬃcient for the worker’s
second signal. The reason is that the second part of the report is needed
as a basis for the worker’s compensation which must be designed in order
to provide eﬀort incentives, while the first part is needed in order to elicit
the worker’s unbiased opinion.15 In contrast, Prendergast (1993) consid-
ers contracts which ask the seller to make only one announcement. As the
implementation of the first-best level of eﬀort e∗ > 0 would require strict
incentives (meaning w1 > w0) to induce the worker to exert positive eﬀort,
the same incentives would make the worker distort his information. By sep-
arating the information channel enabling incentives for eﬀort exertion from
that transmitting the valuable information, the dilemma can be resolved.16
14It is interesting to note that although the worker’s payment is not directly contingent
on his announcement eηw, it may nevertheless aﬀect equilibrium behavior. The reason is
that, since the information transmission becomes eﬃcient, the additional announcement
changes the principal’s revenue resulting from the worker’s eﬀort, so that another eﬀort
level is implemented.
15In order to implement the first best, it is important that the worker’s expected payment
depends only on the second but not on the first part of his report. Otherwise, the worker
might find it in his interest to misrepresent the information in the first part of his report.
If the principal is then unable to track back what the true information must have been,
information transmission is ineﬃcient so that the parties fail to achieve the first best.
16Note that while our result is basically positive since it shows that the first best can
be achieved, it can also be interpreted to be negative because it contradicts Prendergast’s
(1993, p. 764) explanation of why in some circumstances firms may prefer not to oﬀer
incentive pay to workers. In the present model, low-powered (flat) wage schemes can never
be optimal if the class of contracts is not restricted.
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4 Discussion
Four features of the present framework are essential to derive the eﬃciency
result.
Absence of insider concerns: The worker in the model is not interested
in the outcome of the decision to be made by the manager. Relaxing this
assumption must be expected to have serious consequences on eﬃciency since
it will become more diﬃcult to elicit the information of the worker. Consider,
e.g., a division head in a business enterprise reporting to an oﬃcer. If the
oﬃcer’s discretion encompasses, say, the budget of the division, it will be
more likely that the division head distorts information that will aﬀect the
oﬃcer’s budgetary decisions.
Exclusion of rent-seeking possibilities: The first best may not be reached if
the parties can spend socially spurious eﬀort in order to increase their income.
For example, the worker could have the possibility to improve the precision
of his second signal, ηλ, by investing a positive amount in a second eﬀort
variable eλ.17 In that case, the worker may be encouraged to first search for
and then conform to the supervisor’s views.18 If the cost of a marginal eﬀort
for searching for the manager’s signal is suﬃciently low, then the worker will
invest eλ > 0 which is clearly ineﬃcient as this eﬀort generates an additional
cost without revealing any valuable information.
Absence of rents for the worker: In the current setting, the worker earns
no rent in a contractual relationship compared to his outside option. The
first best may not be attainable if the worker earns a positive rent. For
example, if the worker has limited liability (i.e., w0 ≥ 0), his contractual rent
17See also Prendergast (1993, p. 760).
18This is a well-known phenomenon in the literature on so-called leader-member ex-
changes. See Deluga and Perry (1994, p. 81).
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may vary with the eﬀort level. Hence, for the manager the marginal cost
of implementing a given eﬀort level may be diﬀerent with limited liability
when compared to the original setting. Thus, the manager may find it in her
interest to implement an eﬀort level diﬀerent from e∗, so that a social loss may
result. Similar arguments apply when the worker earns a rent because of risk-
aversion, where the worker has to be reimbursed for the risk he faces under
a variable wage contract. Finally, the worker may earn rents from missing
markets at the stage of contracting (e.g. due to asymmetric information),
again potentially with negative eﬀects on welfare.
Complete contracts: When compared to Prendergast’s (1993) ineﬃciency
result, Theorem 1 shows that “yes man” behavior may be a consequence of
exogenous restrictions on the set of feasible contracts. One of the reasons for
the exclusion of integrity contract could be the potentially higher contracting
costs (e.g., due to a higher complexity). However, the exact nature of such
restrictions remains unclear, so that further research on these issues would
be desirable.19
Given our result, it seems natural to ask to what extent the “yes man”
problem can be mitigated by more sophisticated contract design. Beside the
type of contract discussed in this paper we give three, as we think, important
examples for organizational design that can improve eﬃciency of information
acquisition and transmission in organizations.
Delegation: Ineﬃciencies in information acquisition and transmission may
be reduced by the delegation of decisions. However, the gain from avoiding
ineﬃciencies from the distortion of information (and the gain from possibly
better incentives to search for information on the part of the worker) must
19For a recent discussion of incomplete contracting, see Tirole (1999). Cf. also Grossman
and Hart (1986).
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be traded for the loss from a potentially suboptimal decision.20
Advocacy: To avoid the “yes man” problem, supervisors may want to ac-
tively reward open inquiry and meticulous evaluation of their own proposals.
Subordinates could be required to criticize a supervisor’s proposed course
of action by identifying potential flaws, presenting worst case outcomes, and
suggesting alternative ideas.21 In one-dimensional conflicts, the manager may
even want to assign certain roles to her subordinates, who are then rewarded
for evidence that supports only one extreme position.22
Third Parties: The involvement of an independent agent is a natural
measure for mitigating “yes man” behavior. In the oﬃcer — division head
example, typically part of the information would be acquired by a third
party (such as a controlling department or an independent advisor) that
may possess less information than the division head but that can be given
incentives to report truthfully.
5 Conclusion
The model of Prendergast (1993) was designed to pinpoint ineﬃciencies in
organizations resulting from the misrepresentation of information under in-
centive contracts. In this paper we have shown that these ineﬃciencies can
be avoided and that the first best can be achieved by using simple integrity
contracts that give agents a chance to be honest without hurting themselves.
One essential assumption in Prendergast’s original framework that allows
to derive this result is that the worker has no personal interest in the decision
to be made by the manager. Since we would expect that a worker in an
20For a thorough discussion, cf. Aghion and Tirole (1997).
21Cf. Deluga and Perry (1994) and the literature cited there.
22See Dewatripont and Tirole (1998).
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organization is not completely indiﬀerent about the decisions made by his
supervisor (in particular if these decisions concern his professional career),
we find it more convincing to interpret Prendergast’s “worker” as an outsider
to the organization such as an economic or political advisor who is asked to
write an independent report.
Fruitful future research on this topic may hence include the analysis of
“yes man” behavior of a subordinate who has non-trivial preferences regard-
ing the decisions to be made by his supervisor.
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6 Appendix
A. There exists a k such that the second-order condition (1) holds.
We show that for a suﬃciently high k, the term in square brackets in the
second-order condition (1) is negative for any e > 0. Since h00(e) > 0 by
assumption and ∂prob(|M−ηm|<k)∂σ2w < 0 (see Appendix B), it suﬃces to show
that prob(|M − ηm| < k) is strictly concave with respect to σ2w. We will
analyze the term
∂2prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w∂σ2w
=
k
2
√
2πσ7N
exp(− k
2
2σ2
)μ20
£
(3σ2 − k2)μ20N + 4σ4(σ20 + σ2m + σ2λ)
¤
as a function of σ2w, where N = σ20σ2w + σ20σ2m + σ2wσ2m + σ2λ[σ
2
w + σ20]. Note
first that
σ2 = μ21σ
2
0 + μ
2
0σ
2
w + (μ2 − 1)2σ2m + μ22σ2λ.
Clearly, for a given triple of positive σ20, σ2m, σ2λ < ∞, σ2 is bounded from
above since σ2w = h(e) < h(0) < ∞, and since the parameters μ0, μ1, and
μ2 lie in ]0, 1[. On the other hand, the term μ20N is bounded from below since
σ2w is bounded from above. Hence, for any suﬃciently high k, the function
prob(|M − ηm| < k) is strictly concave with respect to σ2w.
B. Proof of (2).
We calculate the first derivative of prob(|M − ηm| < k) with respect to σ2w.
Recall that M = μ0ηw + μ1η0 + μ2ηλ. Hence ξ = M − ηm is normally
distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2 = μ21σ
2
0 + μ
2
0σ
2
w + (μ2 − 1)2σ2m + μ22σ2λ.
A short calculation shows that then ∂σ2/∂σ2w = μ20. Hence, by the definition
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of the derivative and by Leibnitz’s rule,
∂prob(|M − ηm| < k)
∂σ2w
= μ20
∂prob(|ξ| < k)
∂σ2
=
μ20
σ2
∂prob(|ξ| < k)
∂ lnσ2
=
μ20
σ2
lim
ε→0
1
ε
(Z +k
−k
1p
2πσ2 exp(ε)
exp
µ
− x
2
2σ2 exp(ε)
¶
dx
−
Z +k
−k
1√
2πσ2
exp
µ
− x
2
2σ2
¶
dx
¾
=
μ20
σ2
lim
ε→0
1
ε
(Z +k/√exp(ε)
−k/
√
exp(ε)
1√
2πσ2
exp
µ
− ex2
2σ2
¶
dex
−
Z +k
−k
1√
2πσ2
exp
µ
− x
2
2σ2
¶
dx
¾
= −2μ
2
0
σ2
lim
ε→0
1
ε
(Z k
k/
√
exp(ε)
1√
2πσ2
exp
µ
− x
2
2σ2
¶
dx
)
=
2μ20√
2πσ3
exp
µ
− k
2
2σ2
¶µ
∂
∂ε
³
k exp(−ε
2
)
´¶
ε=0
= − kμ
2
0√
2πσ3
exp
µ
− k
2
2σ2
¶
.
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